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Salutius

7. On the Gods and the World

Edited by Paolo Bagnato

XVIII. ATHEISM

1. And is no cause for concern to anyone sensible that atheism1 exists somewhere on Earth and will become more widespread in the future. These things do not affect the Gods, just as it has been shown that even honors do not benefit them, furthermore, due to the weakness of the soul, which is a middle essence, it is not possible to always keep it upright, and it is not possible for the World to equally fully enjoy the providence of the Gods2.

2. But while some parts participate in Them continuously, others at certain times, some primarily, others secondarily, just as the head perceives all sensations and the whole body perceives only one. It seems that for this reason too, those who instituted festivals also instituted inauspicious days on which some temples suspend services, others close, and still others remove their ornaments in expiation for the weakness of our nature3.

3. Moreover, it is not unlikely that atheism is a method of punishment: for as for those who have known the Gods and despised them, it is reasonable that in another life they should be deprived of their knowledge; and as for those who have honored their kings as Gods, it was necessary to do justice by banishing them from the Gods themselves.

XIX. THE PUNISHMENTS

1. There is no need to be surprised if the punishments for these or other sins do not immediately reach sinners, since it is not only the Demons who punish souls, but the soul itself also subjects itself to punishment. And since souls persist for all time4, it is not necessary that all things happen in a short time; this is also appropriate for the existence of virtue. For if punishments immediately followed sins, men would act justly out of fear, without possessing virtue.

2. Souls are punished when they leave the body: some wander here, in the hot or cold places of the earth, others are tormented by the Demons; they suffer all these things through the irrational soul, through which they also sinned; and also through this the shadow-like body is seen near the graves, and especially of those who have lived badly5.

XX. METEMPSYCHOSIS OR TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS

1. If the transmigrations take place into rational beings, the souls become the same as those of those bodies; but if they take place into irrational beings, they follow them from outside, as do the Demons assigned to us: for a rational soul could never become the soul of a being devoid of reason. 

2. The existence of metempsychosis can be observed from congenital diseases – why indeed are some born blind, others paralytic, still others with a sick soul?6 – and from the fact that since by nature souls live by inhabiting bodies, it is necessary that once they have left they do not always remain in inaction7.

3. For if souls were not brought back into bodies, it would be necessary for them to be infinite in number or for God to always create new ones: but nothing infinite exists in the World – for there could not be something infinite in that which is limited – and it is not possible for new ones to be born – for everything in which something new is born is necessarily imperfect or incomplete, but the World, being made of that which is perfect and complete, is suited to being perfect and complete8.

XXI. CONCLUSION

1. The souls that have lived according to Virtue are not only happy9, but have also separated themselves from the irrational part and, purified from every material body, they are united with the Gods and with Them they administrate the entire World10. 2. Yet, even if none of these things happened to souls, at least Virtue itself, the joy and glory that come from Virtue, the life without worries and free are enough to make happy those who have chosen and have been able to live according to Virtue.

  1. It is likely that Salutius, like other pagans, considered Christianity, as well as epicureanism, a form of atheism.[]
  2. This clearly depends on the difference in capacity, among the various parts of the world as well as among the various human souls, to welcome divine Providence. It is not a limitation of the Gods, but of men.[]
  3. Salutius reiterates once again that religious prescriptions are not put into practice to influence the Gods, but for the healing of our imperfect nature.[]
  4. That is, they live forever.[]
  5. That is, the souls of those who have lived in sin remain in some way tied to their bodies. This teaching is also reported by Plato in the Phaedo (81 c-e).[]
  6. Salutius is saying that the conditions that regulate a person’s birth are due to the sins (sskrt. pāpa) and merits (sskrt. puṇya) that a soul has accumulated in previous incarnations.[]
  7. This negative view of the disembodied soul, linked to inaction or laziness (Greek αργία), could be seen as a polemic against Christianity, which rejects the doctrine of metempsychosis. In reality, even for Christianity, the natural state of the soul is to be united with the body, and death, that is, the separation between the two, is a temporary state that will end with the resurrection of the body. Many Church Fathers, in fact, saw in metempsychosis a trace of the Christian doctrine of the universal resurrection. See, for example, Gregory of Nyssa, On the Soul and the Resurrection.[]
  8. We translate with two words, “perfect and complete”, and their opposite the single Greek word τέλειος.[]
  9. The word used here for “happiness” is eudaimonia (Greek εὐδαιμονία) which indicates having with oneself a good daimon (Greek δαίμων) that is, a good divine spirit.[]
  10. Here Salutius, in line with the previous Platonic tradition, speaks of a way in which souls can remain disembodied and far from the evils of this world, without the need to reincarnate, that is, by uniting with the Gods through Virtue. This state is very similar to the Hindu state of the realization of qualified Brahman (sskr. saguṇa), see Gian Giuseppe Filippi: Il post mortem dei sādhaka secondo la dottrina di Śaṃkarācārya, Milano, Ekatos, 2019. The main difference is that in Vedānta it is explicitly stated that the jīvas who reach Brahmaloka do not obtain unlimited divine powers like those of the Lord who alone has the power to govern the Universe (BSŚBh IV, 4, 17), but Śaṃkara explains that this could be harmonized considering the fact that all the individual wills of the liberated jīvas are dependent on the will of the Lord.[]