Svāmī Prakāśānandendra Sarasvatī Mahārāja
2. Extracts from the Commentary on the Adhyāsa Bhāṣya Sugama
Now, we have stated the Pūrvapakṣin was an advaitin discussing how adhyāsa took place. So, it is the adhyāsa process. He said two-three points I just to briefly say and proceed with the present portion. First point was “Jñānasya viṣaya pakṣa patitvāt” that is jñānam invariably and indispensably requires a viṣaya. Therefore, even in a misunderstanding he is making it as a too generalization. A real jñānam requires an object that is true. A jñānam requires an object, a corresponding object of it, object of which this jñānam is. See, jñānam is always about something. In short, he means that jñānam is viṣaya pakṣa patitvāt, i.e. jñānam is always about an object: that’s what he means. Viṣaya pakṣa patitvāt means jñānam sadā viṣaya kaḥ: without an object there can’t be a jñānam, jñānam is always about something. If you say “I have a jñānam”, somebody can ask “Jñānam of what?” You can’t say “Just a jñānam”. Jñānam is always about a thought of the mind, jñānam means manovṛtti.
Since it is about something, even a misunderstanding also being a jñānam, it requires an object about which this jñānam is. This is where he commits a mistake. So jñānam is about something, therefore an object is required is; well, it is perfectly right because that’s how we find it. See, about anything you shouldn’t have a preconceived idea, an ideology, a presupposition. Then look for the facts. First you have to look at the facts and from the facts alone your understanding of it should emerge. Your understanding, your conclusion, your idea about world should emerge from the observation of the facts. You can’t have like this communism or any ism, any other ism. These are ideas, ideologies. Therefore, here you see, “Jñānasya viṣaya pakṣa patitvāt”. Jñānam is always about something.
But here slight difference is the word jñānam; in Sanskrit or Indian languages, is common for a misunderstanding and for understanding. In English also, knowledge is different but word understanding has got a two. Misunderstanding and right understanding: understanding is a common word for both. In right understanding, definitely requires a right understanding, necessarily, invariably, indispensably requires an object because it is about something. But misunderstanding is quite different: you have a misunderstanding about something but the form of your misunderstanding is only a form, there is no a corresponding object for the misunderstanding. There is no form of an object. There is only form of misunderstanding. Misunderstanding is a form about the same reality, about which you have a different understanding. It is a form of understanding alone, there is no object for the misunderstanding. There is only form of misunderstanding.
[The pūrvapakṣin] says there is a seashell(śuktikā), and you have an understanding about śuktikā that it is silver, but what is there is a mother-of-pearl shell. So, there is a contradiction, there is a discrepancy or inconsistency. Why inconsistency? A knowledge necessarily requires an object. Knowledge is always about an object. So, to solve this discrepancy, you have to imagine an object about which this misunderstanding is. See, misunderstanding which is a form of knowledge, a wrong knowledge of course, requires a wrong object, he says. Oh, a mithyā jñānam requires corresponding mithyā padārtha because the rule what they made is: every knowledge is about an object; therefore, misunderstanding should be about a mis-object. Such an expression is not there in English, so we have to create it. For misunderstanding there is a mis-object, that is a wrong object.
Laukika paramārtha now. He says such an object where is it? They are all positing. In English there is a positing means you are logically supposing, imagining, constructing. First you take a principle that a knowledge is about an object, object is required. Now, if here we have a knowledge of a snake or knowledge of silver, then there must be necessarily an object. Then where is that object? [The pūrvapakṣin] says it is a false knowledge, therefore it is required a false object. False knowledge, this is the right expression in English. False knowledge requires a corresponding false object. This is the pūrvapakṣin’s understand. As I told you in the previous upadeśa, Vedāntin’s understanding is: false knowledge also has the real object alone as an object; object doesn’t change, object remains object alone. Regarding the same real object, you have a misunderstanding. So, misunderstanding is a false knowledge without the object being there. In fact, what is misunderstanding? Let me know. What is false knowledge? The very false knowledge means object is one, your understanding about the object is different. This is what we call false knowledge. If false knowledge requires a corresponding false object, as the pūrvapakṣin says, then it is no more false knowledge, it becomes a real knowledge. This is the very mistake. This is the mistake the Vyākhyānakāras did. And you don’t find it in Śaṃkara and Svāmījī discovered that it is unnecessary. A false knowledge requires a false object, then there is an object corresponding to knowledge. If there is an object corresponding to knowledge, then that knowledge becomes a satya jñānam, it doesn’t become mithyā jñānam. Note it. What is mithyā–jñānam? What is false knowledge? False knowledge is only a knowledge being false, not true to the object. False means what? False knowledge is a knowledge which is not true to the object; so, this is what we mean by false knowledge. But he says false knowledge is true to false object, means false knowledge requires some object according to which this knowledge arises. However, then it becomes a true knowledge, real knowledge, it is not false knowledge. It is no more a mithyā-jñānam, it is no more adhyāsa. See, how he missed the basic point. That’s why Satchitānandendra Svāmījī told clearly, they missed, deviated from Śaṃkara. As you say they deviated, they get terribly angry. You call that the tradition is deviated? They have not understood Śaṃkara? Don’t take it to your heart and get hurt. Just it is a matter of fact. Watch carefully what we say, just to verify what we say.
So, a false knowledge means a knowledge which is false, knowledge which is untrue to the object: object is one, the knowledge about it is different from what it is; this is called false knowledge. Now tell me, does false knowledge require a false object corresponding to it? Does mithyā–jñānam require a mithyā–padārtha? If mithyā–jñānam requires mithyā–padārtha, will it not become satya jñānam, true jñānam? Therefore, Svāmījī’s and even Śaṃkara’s conclusion, is that mithyā–jñānam requires no object. There is an object about which this jñānam takes place. There is really some object, but the knowledge is not true to it. They say, whatever the knowledge, even if it is a false knowledge or right knowledge, requires an object. Right knowledge requires to be true to the object. False knowledge also claims to be true to the object: but false knowledge requiring a false object is an anomalous Vedānta.
Did you get the point? I don’t know, I have been repeating, repeating. People say, where is the difference between Śaṃkara and post śaṃkarite Vedānta? What is the difference? I have been telling it in my teachings. I don’t know why some people missed it. They ask again and again. Even our own committee people asked, “Svāmījī what is the difference”? Ayyo Rāma! You have not read his books? His books are available in Kannada, Sanskrit and English, in a simple language which anybody can understand. And still are you asking me? But I have been telling it in my classes throughout. Anyway, I don’t know, because they miss it. It is probably too subtle for them. It is so open, so obvious, but for some people it looks very deep, very minute and deep it looks like. Nevertheless, it is so simple, straight, it is so visible in front of you. But they feel it is very difficult to understand and they are unable to understand. Anyway, probably that is why it is our job. It is a job of a person like me, keep repeating, repeating and telling. So, some of you must have understood in one stroke alone, but for others who have not understood, I am just repeating it.
Now he [the pūrvapakṣin] says, now there is a silver, because he told that the mithyā-object is required. But now where is it? He made of a requirement a principle, but the Fact should be there. He says “It must be there; therefore, it is there”. See how he explains: it must be there, therefore it is there. How? Because it must be there. It is there because it must be there. How it is there? We imagine that it is there. Very beautiful philosophy.! It has become like a western philosophy. You start speculating rather than pointing out and discovering. Do you discover the Fact or you imagine the Fact? Imagine the things there. Anyway, it is a mother-of-pearl shell, but you are thinking about it as a silver. It is rope, but your understanding about it is snake. Therefore, to solve this discrepancy, you have to assume there must be some snake and some object of silver, because you already got a knowledge of snake, because you already got a knowledge of silver. Then, you must see that there must be an object called silver, an object called snake. But where is that snake? If it is a snake, everybody must see. If you mistake, you alone see the snake. Does everybody see it? Others may not see. Then, he [il pūrvapakṣin] says it is different from the usual snake. Different from the empirically real snake: if it were usual snake or usual silver, everybody would have seen. But the fact is that others are unable to see, it is not visible to others. Therefore, what happens? This snake, or this silver, is born just at the time of misunderstanding. Along with misunderstanding, a wrong silver, a false snake simultaneously arises as it not now. How does it arise? So, therefore, we must accept a false snake or a false object snake. A false object snake, a false object silver. Okay, this much he argued.
Now he explains the process of production of object snake or of object silver. He says adhyāsa means this object-adhyāsa. You will find “object-adhyāsa” if you read the post śaṃkarite Sanskrit commentaries, immediately after Śaṃkara, within the one century, half century alone. Within half century or maybe few decades alone you start finding it. But in Śaṃkara’s statements it is not found. Svāmījī wonders the same thing. In Śaṃkara Bhāṣya it is so clear. He talks of only false knowledge. Then, they started creating a false object. How did it come? I think the commentator, the first commentator on Śaṃkara comes from another tradition. I mean that there must be somebody in Śaṃkara’s time who brought from that by and put it on Śaṃkara’s and called it a Śaṃkara commentary. And from there it went on. Svāmījī says you don’t find it anywhere in Śaṃkara Bhāṣya. So, “false object”; they call it as a mithyā padārtha. Mithyā jñānam, which should require a mithyā padārtha. So, mithyā jñānam is a false knowledge, a misunderstanding; for this they aver that there is a mithyā padārtha. Instead of this, Śaṃkarācārya says adhyāsa: ignorance in the form of wrong thinking (adhyāso mithyā pratyaya rūpaḥ). Śaṃkara always talks of adhyāsa is mithyā jñānam, false knowledge alone is misunderstanding. False knowledge, bhrāma is adhyāsa. False knowledge, misunderstanding, bhrāma is adhyāsa. But [the pūrvapakṣin] says misunderstanding alone is not adhyāsa: a false object also is required as adhyāsa. He says there is no jñānam adhyāsa without artha adhyāsa. These are the terms you come across in post śaṃkarites commentaries. When we say that Śaṃkara also speaks of jñānam adhyāsa, they add the artha adhyāsa. When we ask them about, they say, “Oh it is not found in Śaṃkara, but the post śaṃkarite ācāryas have developed it, they have improved Śaṃkara and they made Śaṃkara more perfect”. If you ask all of the people, they say, “What you say is true, it is not found in Śaṃkara Bhāṣyas; yet we must accept it, only in this way Śaṃkara Bhāṣyas become complete, otherwise Śaṃkara Bhāṣyas are incomplete”. See this is their explanation.
Therefore, ignorance-object (artha adhyāsa). When we quote this Śaṃkara’s statement, adhyāso mithyā pratyaya rūpaḥ, they get irritated. See, Bhāṣyakāra says, adhyāso mithyā pratyaya rūpaḥ, that’s all. Therefore, nowadays what they are doing is, they are remaining silent and don’t answer Satchidānandendra Svāmījī’s at all. Just they boycott him by silence. Just don’t answer, don’t talk of him, don’t refer to him, as if he is non-existent.
We will see in Adhyāsa Bhāṣya alone this: indeed, ignorance is a false thought of something else, on which buddhi feeds (adhyāso mithyā pratyayaḥ, atasmin tad buddhi ityādi camati). Elsewhere he repeats: atasmin tad buddhi ityāvo cama. We already said adhyāsa is atasmin tad buddhiḥ, a thought of it about what it is now, a thought of something, a thought of something which is different. It means that adhyāsa is only a pratyaya, it is only a notion, not an object. But now, on this each statement, wherever Śaṃkara says, adhyāsa is a notion, they add: “Yes, adhyāsa is a notion, and also an object. So, keep on adding, adding, adding, adding, at each place wherever Śaṃkara says, they keep on adding, adding, adding. So, this added version of Adhyāsa Bhāṣya is popular among the post śaṃkarites. And a lot of added censored. Censored means they totally changed many things. Svāmījī says just to follow the Bhāṣya as it is, you get a very clean Vedānta, according to anubhava, no speculation.
Now how does it happen? He [the pūrvapakṣin] speaks about the process of adhyāsa. Since he has accepted false knowledge as well as a false object (mithyā–jñānam e mithyā padārtha, jñāna–adhyāsa, artha–adhyāsa), these two are simultaneously taking place. Now, he says, there is a consciousness circumscribed by the rope (rajju avacchinna caitanyam). Rajju means rope, avacchinna caitanyam is consciousness limited to the rope, consciousness in an evident form (sākṣāt). So, on consciousness limited to rope, on that consciousness, there is a sticking to that consciousness, there is avidyā, a positive avidyā, something substantial, a material. Why it should be material? Because it has to produce the snake, the false object snake. Therefore, some thin layer, thin layer of avidyā, of a positive avidyā sticking to that consciousness as also the same ajñānam is sticking to Sākṣin. It is sticking to Sākṣin and it is sticking also to the sākṣāt rope. Now, when I try to see the rope, my eyesight goes trying to reach the rope; but before it reaches completely, before my eyesight, my vision, covers the rope completely, somewhere some obstruction happens.
So, avidyā, positive avidyā is in your Sākṣin, it is sticking to Sākṣin and it is sticking to the rope, or to the consciousness of rope, in their dictum. The avidyā which is covering the consciousness of the rope transforms into snake, and that avidyā sticking to your Sākṣin transforms into misunderstanding. There are two sides: subjective side and objective side. Subjective side, that avidyā transforms into false knowledge. Objective side, that avidyā which is sticking to the rope-consciousness transforms into snake and appears as a snake over the rope. Very beautiful picture! I think this will make a very good kadambari. Therefore, you have a snake knowledge here and the snake object there. Because our rule was every knowledge is about an object even a misunderstanding, false knowledge also is about an object; that object may be false, but an object is required. Some object is required, this is their rule.
Next question comes, why do you call mithyā? See, we put a question, if a knowledge is true to object, it is satya jñānam. If knowledge is different from what the object is, it is a false knowledge, means untrue knowledge. Every language has its own beauty. English has a very good expression, “true to the object”, means knowledge is exactly the way the object is. If it is not true, means slightly distorted: object is one way and your knowledge is something different about the same object. Object is same, but your understanding is somewhat different about it. So, a different way of understanding the same object is called mithyā jñānam, it is called false knowledge. Now, our objection to them is, false knowledge is about the same object, understanding differently. But in your case, false knowledge requires a corresponding false object; therefore, your false knowledge is true to object. If the knowledge is true to the object, how can you call it mithyā jñānam?
But Śaṃkarācārya is telling mithyā–jñānam is adhyāsa. He has been telling it hundreds of times throughout his Bhāṣyas. Mithyā jñānam is a false knowledge. But according to their [of the post śaṃkarites]. explanation, false knowledge is true to some object. If it is true to some object, it can no more be false knowledge, it will be true knowledge alone; then how will you call it mithyā jñānam? Then, this doubt arises. So, they answer, jñānam alone is not mithyā. The false knowledge and the false snake, both together are mithyā. Why mithyā? Because they are a product of mithyā avidyā. There is a falseignorance (mithyā avidyā). Mithyā avidyā sticking to Sākṣin and also sticking to the rope-consciousness. It is a positive thin layer, thin layer sticking, covering up Brahman. It covers up Brahman consciousness and also transforms into rope, transforms into snake, sorry, because it covers the rope-consciousness and also transforms into snake. This avidyā is a false avidyā. Therefore, this snake as well as the knowledge of the snake are products of that false avidyā, products of that false positive substantial avidyā. Positive means a kind of a thinly substantial avidyā. It is a product of false avidyā; therefore, it is called false.
How we define false? What is false knowledge? How do you understand? A knowledge which is not true to the object really lying there is called false knowledge; that alone is called mithyā jñānam. By knowing the right object, false knowledge goes away, gets corrected. This is commonly understood. Now, they have got a peculiar definition of mithyā: mithyā–jñānam requires a mithyā object and these two are called mithyā. But we say, how can you call them mithyā? The knowledge is true to an object! They reply, “Yes, knowledge is true to the object, yet it is a mithyā. How? It is mithyā for due to different reason. The snake knowledge is false not due to its not being true to the snake; snake knowledge is true to the false snake”. Then it is not mithyā: the snake knowledge being true to the snake is not mithyā. Their explanation is that snake-knowledge and snake-object, both of them being the product of false ajñānam, are mithyā. There is another positive substance called ajñānam. Since it is a product of mithyā avidyā, product of mithyā ajñānam, therefore it is mithyā. See how they define mithyā! So that means it being the product of mithyā-ajñānam, it is called mithyā. It is called false knowledge because this snake as well as the knowledge of the snake, both are the product of a false ignorance. Where is that? It is a thin layer. It is not simple absence of knowledge. Something, a positive substance which covers the knowledge, covers up the consciousness, covers up the Sākṣin. It covers up the Sākṣin, veils over the Sākṣin, āvaraṇam they call it. It veils the Sākṣin, it veils the rope-consciousness. Something positive, thinly positive substance, that substance is a false avidyā, false ignorance. That false ignorance produces these two.
Which ones? Knowledge of the snake and object snake. Knowledge snake, object snake, both are true to each other. Knowledge snake is true to knowledge object. Knowledge object is perceived while snake-knowledge is there. So, these two simultaneously arise and these two are produced by something positive avidyā sticking to the rope, sticking to your Sākṣin also covering it up. It covers the rope-consciousness, it covers the Sākṣin-consciousness and transforms into snake as well as the snake knowledge. Therefore, now this snake-knowledge and snake-object are mithyā. Mithyā for what reason? Shall I repeat it another time? What is commonly mithyā and their definition of mithyā?
Let us distinguish. Commonly we think knowledge is false if it is not true to the object: object is one, your knowledge about it is something different, deviated from it, different. This is called false knowledge. Falseness consists only in knowledge. Falseness is not an object. This is what a common man thinks. This is what Śaṃkarācārya says. This is what Satchidanandendra Svāmījī says. Falseness consists only in knowledge. Mithyātvam is only in knowledge. Mithyātvam is not an object. But they say post śaṃkarites mithyātvam is in the object, is in the knowledge. How can you say that? For them mithyātvam consists in an object as well as in knowledge, there is a mithyā–jñānam and mithyā object, false knowledge and false object. In that case, as we objected already, mithyā–jñānam is true to mithyā object. If mithyā–jñānam is or requires a corresponding mithyā object, then that mithyā–jñānam is no more mithyā–jñānam, it becomes satya jñānam, because it is a knowledge without an object or untrue to the real object. If knowledge is true to object, it becomes satya jñānam, it is no more mithyā–jñānam. But they say mithyā–jñānam requires a corresponding mithyā padārtha. So, false knowledge is true to false object. There is a knowledge snake and there is an object snake. If knowledge is true to object, then it becomes satya jñānam. How do you call mithyā? In answer to this they say they become mithyā: mithyājñānam and corresponding mithyā object, both of them are called mithyā because they are the product of some mithyā–ajñānam. There is some mithyā–ajñānam, a thin positive substance, a veiling, covering, doing āvaraṇam of Sākṣin as well as of the rope-consciousness. That is a positive substance, that is mithyā, which is covering rope-consciousness as well as the Sākṣin.
But then why do you call it mithyā? Just because it is a positive substance, just because it is covering your Sākṣin, just because it is covering your rope-consciousness, just because it is transforming into mithyā–jñānam and mithyā padārtha? Why do you call mithyā? For them mithyā means anirvacanīya. So, mithyā means neither exist nor doesn’t exist. Mithyā means that positive ajñānam, which is sticking to Sākṣin as well as the rope-consciousness and it is a thin layer positive substance, transforms into snake-object as well as the snake-knowledge. It transforms into sarpa jñānam and sarpa padārtha. That mithyā, that ajñānam, positive ajñānam, thing-ignorance (bhāva ajñānam), why do you call mithyā? Because it neither exists nor doesn’t exist, it is sadasadhyama anirvacanīyam: neither you can say it exists nor you can say it doesn’t exist. It is mithyā because of this existing non-existing in between nature, neither you can categorize as existing nor categorize as non-existing.
Do you understand what is mithyā? We generally take mithyā means false knowledge. See the general meaning let us take it. Leave aside the post śaṃkarites. What is mithyā? Mithyā is only knowledge, there is no mithyā-object at all! Mithyātvam consists in jñānam alone. Falsity is only in terms of knowledge. Falsity is not in terms of object. Why falsity is only in terms of knowledge and not in object? Because knowledge is about an object. Knowledge requires an object. But if object is one, knowledge is somewhat different from it, then we call it false knowledge. Ion the contrary, if knowledge is true to object it is called correct knowledge (samyag jñānam).If knowledge is not true to object, if the understanding about the thing is different from what it is, what actually is, that is called false knowledge. Therefore, falsity can only be in knowledge, there is no false object. Agreed? Therefore, mithyā can be the adjective to jñānam alone, mithyā–jñānam.
Now, why do you call it mithyā? When there is a snake knowledge corresponding to snake object the knowledge is true to object because the snake object is lying there; you have a knowledge of it and your knowledge is true to the object. When your snake knowledge is true to the object, it becomes a samyag jñānam, no more false. Then how do you call it false? This is our objection. They reply, “Because they are the product of mithyā ajñānam, some mithyā substance”. What is that ajñānam which you talked which I have never heard? “It must be there, you must accept it”. Where is it? “It is in your Sākṣin consciousness, it is covering the Sākṣin, sticking to the Sākṣin and also it covers the rope-knowledge, rope-consciousness. It remains in two ways, subjective and objective, both together. And that avidyā being false, its product also becomes false”. Why that is false? “Because it is an indescribable state of being and non-being (sadasadbhyā anirvacanīyam)”. For them falsity is a nature of a thing; for us falsity is only in knowledge, because it is not true to the object. Falsity, mithyātvam consists in knowledge, i.e., when the knowledge is about an object but not true to it, the object. Therefore, falsity consists in knowledge alone. They say falsity is a nature of a thing that it is neither existing nor non-existing. So, sadasadbhyā anirvacanīyam is false. Mithyātvam means what? Neither it exists nor it doesn’t exist. It cannot be categorized as existing or non-existing. This uncategorizable nature means inability to categorize either as existing or non-existing; this nature is called falsity.
Now you understand. Śaṃkara’s or Satchidanandendra Svāmījī’s falsity and their falsity. This is a very subtle thing, highly technical. That’s why I am repeating. So, I think you have understood, it should be very clear now. Now we will proceed: so, two things, knowledge snake and object snake, jñāna adhyāsa e artha adhyāsa, are corresponding to each other. In this case, too, there is no falsity, because the knowledge is true to the object. Then it is a samyag-jñānam, there is no false jñānam. See, isn’t it? It is not mithyā–jñānam, yet they call it mithyā–jñānam and mithyā object; snake knowledge and snake object, both together become mithyā for them. Both together are mithyā. How? Why? Because they are the product of mithyā material: since they are product of mithyā material, they are called mithyā padārtha and mithyā–jñānam. Do you see in which direction they are going? The telugu fairy tale tells that magician fakir’s life is in a parrot, somewhere under a tree. Where it is? It is across the seven oceans. So, this jagat is mithyā because it has got a positive kāraṇam and that kāraṇam produces it. It is mithyā because it is a product of the mithyā material, otherwise, itself is not mithyā.
Then why that causal substance is mithyā? Because it is neither existing nor non-existing. It cannot be categorized, is uncategorizable as existing or non-existing. So, this kind of uncategorizably is mithyā and this uncategorizably is the quality, is the nature of that material avidyā which is covering up the Sākṣin and also the rope-consciousness. And it is the nature, the quality of a substance that is called mithyā. See, mithyātvam is a quality about a thing. Mithyātvam is a nature about a thing. See, how the mithyā has gone. Therefore, the very idea of mithyā in post śaṃkarites is different from mithyā in Śaṃkara. I think I have made it sufficiently clear.
How you remove this mithyā-jnana? Falsity (mithyātvam) consists in knowledge, not object. There is no mithyā-object, nobody can see it. If it is an object, it is there. If it is an object, it is real. Why knowledge alone can be false? Because knowledge can be not true to the object. The form of knowledge could be different from the actuality: object is one way, your understanding about it is somewhat different; this is called false knowledge. If there is a corresponding object to this knowledge, that knowledge is no more false knowledge. It becomes a true knowledge. If a knowledge requires a corresponding object to it, if snake-knowledge requires a corresponding snake-object, it becomes a satya jñānam, samyag jñānam, it is no more mithyā jñānam.
And another point is that ignorance takes the form of wrong thinking (adhyāso mithyā pratyaya rūpaḥ). Śaṃkara in all his Bhāṣya says mithyā–jñānam is adhyāsa. Adhyāsa is only jñāna adhyāsa, there is no artha adhyāsa, there is no object-adhyāsa, there is only wrong knowledge (mithyā–jñānam). There is only false knowledge and that alone is adhyāsa. Adhyāso mithyā pratyaya rūpaḥ, atasmin tad buddhiḥ ityāvo cama: like this in the very Adhyāsa Bhāṣya he says mithyātvam is only in jñānam and that mithyā jñānam is adhyāsa. And he repeats the same thing in all his Prasthānatraya Bhāṣyas.
Pūrvapakṣa should become very clear, don’t get confused. How to remove this avidyā? For us, you see, mithyā–jñānam is untrue to the object. False knowledge is: you have a knowledge about something, but not true to that something. You have a knowledge of snake about the rope, it is not true to the rope; therefore, it is a false knowledge. Then, how to correct the false knowledge? Come to the right vision of the rope. When you have a vision of the rope, snakeness of the rope is false. Snakeness in understanding, knowledge-snakeness about the rope is false because you should have the ropeness about the rope. You can’t have snakeness about the rope, about knowledge alone, not about object. Snakeness is a thought about the rope; therefore, it is a falsity. This falsity gets corrected when you come to spot the rope. “Oh, I misunderstood. I thought it to be snake. It is not. It is rope alone”. Your misunderstanding, your wrong understanding of the rope gets corrected and you see the rope. Now, if, as they say, that positive substance is the cause of the adhyāsa and if that is the mithyā, how could you remove that ignorance in the form of false knowledge (mithyā bhāvarūpa avidyā)? How do you remove that? It becomes a very absurd thing. They have got a strange explanation of how to remove that avidyā. This removal of avidyā is the next point in the Pūrvapakṣa.